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The Paradox of Agency: 
Feeling Powerful Reduces Brokerage Opportunity Recognition yet Increases 
Willingness to Broker 
 
Abstract 
Research suggests positions of brokerage in organizational networks provide many benefits, 
but studies tend to assume everyone is equally able to perceive and willing to act on 
brokerage opportunities. Here we challenge these assumptions in a direct investigation of 
whether people can perceive brokerage opportunities and are willing to broker. We propose 
that the psychological experience of power diminishes individuals’ ability to perceive 
opportunities to broker between people who are not directly connected in their networks, yet 
enhances their willingness to broker. In Study 1, we find that employees in a marketing and 
media agency who had a high sense of power were likely to see fewer brokerage 
opportunities in their advice networks. In Study 2, we provide causal evidence for this claim 
in an experiment where the psychological experience of power is manipulated. Those who 
felt powerful, relative to those who felt little power, tended to see fewer brokerage 
opportunities than actually existed, yet were more willing to broker, irrespective of whether 
there was a brokerage opportunity present. Collectively, these findings present a paradox of 
agency: Individuals who experience power are likely to underperceive the very brokerage 
opportunities for which their sense of agency is suited. 
 
keywords: social networks; power; brokerage; structural holes; transitivity  
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People get ahead in their careers in part because of their occupation of brokerage roles 
in the workplace (Burt, 1992; Fang et al., 2015). Brokerage involves controlling and 
coordinating the flow of ideas and information between currently disconnected people (Lingo 
& O’Mahony, 2010). People who occupy brokerage positions tend to excel in terms of job 
performance (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001), creative ideas (Burt, 2004), and innovation 
(Baer, Evans, Oldham, & Boasso, 2015). But the wide variation in the outcomes of those 
occupying brokerage positions (Burt, 2005) is little understood (Burt, Kilduff, & Tasselli, 
2013). To address this issue, we investigate whether some people who have access to 
brokerage opportunities fail to perceive them. We suggest that people who feel powerful may 
be ready and willing to engage in brokerage yet be unable to perceive the brokerage 
opportunities available. 
In bringing a psychological perspective to bear on how brokerage is perceived in 
organizations, we challenge two assumptions current in the network literature. The first 
assumption is that a network position (such as brokerage) provides opportunities even when 
the occupant of the position may misperceive the surrounding network structure (e.g., Cook, 
Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi, 1983). We challenge this assumption on the basis that 
mental representations of such network opportunities are the necessary first step before 
people can take advantage of these opportunities (Smith, Menon, & Thompson, 2012). We 
argue that the subjective feeling of power (i.e., “the perception of one’s ability to influence 
another person or other people”; Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012, p. 316) affects the extent 
to which individuals identify brokerage opportunities in social networks. We emphasize that 
subjective feelings of power can prompt the heuristic processing of social information (Smith 
& Trope, 2006) with consequences that include filling in the gaps in social structure. Thus, 
those who feel powerful are likely to perceive connections between people even when these 
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connections are absent (Freeman, 1992). The personal sense of power is likely to reduce 
awareness of the gaps in social networks that represent brokerage opportunities.  
Second, we challenge the assumption in prior network research (e.g., Burt, 2005) that 
the presence of brokerage opportunities is by itself sufficient motivation for the individual to 
be willing to pursue these brokerage opportunities. We suggest that the agency induced by a 
personal sense of power (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Anderson et al., 2012) is a key 
influence on people’s willingness to engage in brokerage whether or not brokerage 
opportunities are available. People who have a low personal sense of power are likely to be 
relatively unwilling to pursue brokerage opportunities. 
In two studies, we develop and test theory concerning what we term the paradox of 
agency: Although those who feel powerful are more willing to pursue brokerage than those 
who feel less powerful, those who feel more powerful are less able to perceive brokerage 
opportunities. Whereas sociological studies of power and exchange networks (e.g., Cook & 
Whitmeyer, 1992) suggest that individuals have power as a result of their connections in the 
network, our perspective suggests the psychological experience of power itself affects 
individuals’ perceptions of brokerage opportunities in the network, and their willingness to 
broker across these social divides. 
Brokerage Opportunities in Social Networks 
Brokerage theory builds on the long tradition of work concerning social interactions 
among a triad of three people (e.g., Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Heider, 1958). The broker is 
the third who benefits from connecting two otherwise disconnected people (Simmel, 1923) 
by controlling the flow of resources between them (Cook & Whitmeyer, 1992; Neuhofer, 
Kittel, & Reindl, 2016; Yamagishi, Gillmore, & Cook, 1988). In the traditional structural 
view, “social structure can dominate motivation” (Granovetter, 2005, p. 34): People who may 
be motivated to broker are unable to do so unless they occupy a brokerage position in an open 
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triad in which they connect otherwise disconnected individuals. Prior work from this 
perspective on the benefits of brokerage has assumed that individuals are similar to each 
other in their ability to notice disconnections among contacts (e.g., Burt, 2005, p. 60). 
We challenge this structural perspective by noting that the existence of a brokerage 
opportunity in one or more open triads is an insufficient explanation for brokerage. Some 
people may have access to numerous brokerage opportunities but fail to perceive them, 
whereas others may have limited access to brokerage opportunities yet perceive them 
accurately. Furthermore, even an accurate perception of brokerage opportunities may not be 
enough for individuals to benefit from them – people also have to be willing to broker. 
Whether individuals feel a sense of power, we propose, is important for understanding 
whether they (a) perceive brokerage opportunities and (b) show willingness to act on these 
opportunities. 
Power and Brokerage 
Power derives from many sources, including formal positions of authority (Guinote, 
2017; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, the most immediate determinant of attitudes and 
behavior is the individual’s subjective sense of power (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Power from formal authority is incorporated in subjective 
feelings concerning how much control and agency people feel they have vis-à-vis others 
(Bakan, 1966; Foa & Foa, 1974; Hogan, 1983; Moskowitz, 1994; Wiggins, 1979). If the 
individual feels powerless, then being legitimately in control of resources may avail the 
individual of little agency (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). If the individual feels powerful, then 
the absence of a resource, such as information essential for a group task, is unlikely to 
prevent the individual from behaving proactively and exerting influence over the group 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). As research has indicated, “sometimes the [objectively] 
powerful are inhibited, indecisive, and risk averse [whereas] … the powerless, at times, do 
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act and take risks” (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008, p. 558). Indeed, a large 
body of research shows that subjective feelings of power are the most proximal determinant 
of behavior, above and beyond actual power, although the latter of course feeds into the 
former (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky et al., 2003), and objective control over 
resources may matter for other outcomes. 
How Does Personal Sense of Power Affect Brokerage Opportunity Recognition? 
A personal sense of power energizes individuals to pursue goals and opportunities in 
their social realms (Guinote, 2017; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Thus, we might 
expect a greater sense of power to increase individuals’ alertness to disconnects between their 
contacts, given the rewards associated with brokerage opportunities (Burt et al., 2013). 
However, people who feel powerful, relative to those who feel less powerful, also feel more 
psychologically distant from other people, and therefore tend to engage in abstract thinking 
toward these other people (Magee & Smith, 2013; Smith & Trope, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 
2010). This tendency toward abstraction leads those who feel powerful to think about their 
social contacts in a less effortful, less deliberate, more heuristic way (Smith & Trope, 2006). 
By contrast, those who experience low power tend to engage in systematic processing of the 
details of relationships, and therefore tend to be more accurate in their perceptions of social 
ties (Simpson & Borch, 2005; Simpson, Markovsky, & Steketee, 2011). 
We argue that feeling a sense of power is apt to affect perception of social networks. 
Cognitive network research shows that, in general, people struggle to learn and recall who is 
connected to whom in the workplace (Brands, 2013; Kilduff & Brass, 2010). To compensate, 
people “chunk” the network into triads as a fundamental way of learning and recalling who is 
connected to whom (Brashears & Quintane, 2015; De Soto, 1960; Janicik & Larrick, 2005). 
Moreover, people tend to mistakenly assume these triads are closed, that is, all members of 
the three-person group are connected to each other (Freeman, 1992; Krackhardt & Kilduff, 
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1999). For example, if an employee has two advice partners at work, he or she is likely to 
assume advice flows from one partner to the other. Crucially, a closed triad (referred to as a 
transitive triad in the network literature; e.g., Madhavan, Gnyawali, & He, 2004) offers no 
brokerage opportunity. Only when there is a missing connection between two contacts can a 
person broker information between them. We invoke construal-level theory (Smith & Trope, 
2006) to suggest that this tendency toward heuristic, abstract processing of social network 
connections is more pronounced among those who feel powerful. Personal sense of power, in 
accentuating the tendency toward misperceiving non-existent connections among the 
individual’s contacts, thus reduces the likelihood that people recognize the missing links 
among their contacts that represent brokerage opportunities. 
Conversely, people who feel relatively powerless are unlikely to think in broad and 
abstract terms because they feel dependent on other people (Fiske, 1993) and experience 
greater demands from social situations (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 
2008). Those who lack a sense of power pay more attention to others, including showing 
empathic concern (Woltin, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Förster, 2011), taking others’ perspectives 
(Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), and responding to others’ psychological states 
(Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Van Kleef et al., 2008). Thus, brokerage opportunities 
should be more easily recognized by those who lack a sense of power. 
Hypothesis 1: The higher an individual’s personal sense of power, the fewer 
brokerage opportunities the individual perceives. 
How Does Personal Sense of Power Affect Willingness to Broker? 
A related question concerns who is motivated to engage in brokerage (irrespective of 
whether brokerage opportunities are available). Although the benefits of brokerage in 
organizations are well-established (Burt, 2005), brokerage activity is unlikely to appeal to 
everyone, as it can be onerous and stressful (Stovel & Shaw, 2012). Coordinating and sharing 
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information with people who have different expertise, vocabulary, and goals requires 
considerable effort and skill (Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010). Managers with ties to people in 
different departments tend to experience role strain (Mehra & Schenkel, 2008). The 
brokerage role of spanning the social divides in organizations brings career rewards (Fang et 
al., 2015), but also imposes psychological costs involving potential loss of reputation 
(Podolny & Baron, 1997; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). Given these potential downsides, the question 
of who is willing to broker is an important one to address. 
We suggest that those who feel powerful are likely to be active in brokerage attempts 
because feelings of power lead the individual to focus on the advantages of brokerage while 
overlooking the drawbacks. Those who feel powerful tend to see social situations more in 
terms of rewards (e.g., thinking that others will like them) and less in terms of threats (e.g., 
thinking that others will be angry toward them) (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Thus, we 
anticipate that those who feel powerful will tend to see brokerage activity as an attractive 
opportunity rather than as an onerous burden. The experience of power also leads people to 
be resistant to situational pressures (Galinsky et al., 2008). Those who feel powerful may, 
therefore, tend to discount the role strain associated with brokering between people. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher an individual’s personal sense of power, the more willing 
the individual is to engage in brokerage between two parties. 
Overview of Studies 
  We conducted two studies that complemented each other in terms of examining how 
feelings of power affected perceptions of brokerage. First, we collected data from the main 
campus of a global marketing and technology agency to test our first prediction that greater 
feelings of power are associated with perceiving fewer brokerage opportunities. In this 
company, awareness of brokerage opportunities was an important aspect of ensuring 
collaborative outcomes. Our test of Hypothesis 1 focused on the ego network -- the set of 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      8 
 
connections within which the individual is embedded. In Study 2, we extended Study 1’s 
results through an experiment in which we manipulated feelings of power and examined 
individuals’ learning of brokerage opportunities among a hypothetical set of future 
colleagues. Thus, we tested Hypothesis 1 in the context of a set of people with whom the 
participant was not currently connected. We also tested Hypothesis 2’s prediction that power 
increases willingness to act on brokerage opportunities, including cases where brokerage 
opportunities were present (or not). 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. We emailed a survey invitation to all 211 employees working across 
four departments (client services, creative design, accounting, and sales) of a media agency. 
Complete responses were received from 162 individuals for a valid response rate of 77% (64 
women, 98 men, Mage = 34.44, SD = 8.29). 
Measures 
 Sense of power. To capture the psychological experience of power, we used the mean 
of eight items from the Sense of Power scale (Anderson et al., 2012;  = .85; end points: 1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We prefaced each question with the stem: “In my 
relationships with others at work…” Examples of items include: “I think I have a great deal 
of power,” “I can get them to listen to what I say,” and “Even when I try, I am not able to get 
my way” (reverse-scored). 
 Perceived brokerage opportunities. Our dependent variable reflects the extent to 
which the respondent (i.e., “ego” in network terminology) perceives missing relations among 
ego’s direct connections (i.e., “alters”). These missing connections (absent ties between 
alters) represent opportunities for brokerage (Oh & Kilduff, 2008). To gain information on 
ego’s perceived advice network, we asked respondents to “consider who you go to for advice 
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about important matters, such as help with problems at work, knowledge about how to handle 
a particular situation, and so on. Who do you go to most frequently for advice in this 
company?” Then, on the following page, the names that each respondent had provided were 
displayed in a square matrix that allowed the respondent to provide perceptions of who, 
among the alters listed, went to whom for advice. From these data, we calculated the number 
of transitive (i.e., fully connected) triads that included ego and divided this by the number of 
potentially transitive triads that included ego (Holland & Leinhardt, 1970; Oh & Kilduff, 
2008, p. 1159) to produce a measure of connectedness.
1
 Because we were interested in the 
extent of disconnectedness (i.e., brokerage opportunities) in ego’s network, we changed the 
sign of the proportion from positive to negative in reporting the analyses. 
Note that a transitive advice triad is a closed triad in the sense that one individual 
provides advice to two alters between whom there is an advice relation, as illustrated by the 
triad on the left in Figure 1. An intransitive triad (one which offers a brokerage opportunity) 
is an open triad in the sense that the advice relation between the two alters is absent, as 
illustrated in the triad on the right in Figure 1. 
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
 
Controls. We controlled for age, gender, and formal organizational rank given the 
likelihood that these variables affected perceptions of power. To control for the inherent 
tendency to connect across gaps in social structure, we used the mean of three items (e.g., “I 
find it easy to bring individuals together”) from the seven-point Propensity to Connect with 
Others’ scale (Totterdell, Holman, & Hukin, 2008;  = .75). We also included two network-
related controls. First, we controlled for actual brokerage opportunities, using the roster 
method (e.g., Mehra et al., 2001) to collect actual advice network data across the four 
departments. We asked each respondent to look over a list of all employees across the four 
departments and indicate each person he or she went to for help and advice.
 
Each individual 
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could list up to ten names. A person was considered to actually go to another for advice only 
if that person claimed that he or she went to the other for advice. This definition of an actual 
advice link is known as the row-dominated locally aggregated structure (Krackhardt, 1987) 
and follows the standard procedure in network analysis (e.g., Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994, p. 
92). Although this presents the challenge of not having the ties “confirmed” by a criterion 
(e.g., behavioral reports), research shows that people are reliable at gauging who regularly 
provides advice, even if they are poor at recalling who provided them with advice on specific 
occasions (Freeman, Romney, & Freeman, 1987). Connections among the people that ego 
nominated above were determined by data not from ego, but from other respondents’ 
nominations. Thus, ego would be connected to John and Eve if ego indicated going to each of 
them for advice, but an advice connection from Eve to John would only be recorded if Eve 
indicated she went to John for advice. We calculated the number of transitive (i.e., fully 
connected) triads that included ego and divided this by the number of potentially transitive 
triads that included ego and reversed the sign of the proportion in analyses so as to represent 
actual brokerage opportunities. Second, to control for the possibility that larger networks 
offer more brokerage opportunities, we controlled for network size (i.e., the number of 
contacts ego has) in the actual and perceived advice networks. Further details on network 
measurement, including supplemental analyses using betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977) 
and network constraint (Burt, 1992) as additional control variables for measures of structural 
position, are included in the Appendix. This research was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Cambridge (protocol number: 2010.60) under the application, 
“Social Network Perceptions and Leadership Effectiveness.”  
Analytic Procedure 
 The measure of perceived brokerage opportunities is bounded at zero and one, making 
it inappropriate for ordinary least squares analysis. Thus we followed similar network 
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research (see Kleinbaum, 2012; Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti, & Schippers, 2010) and 
conducted fractional logit regressions with robust standard errors to adjust for the non-
independence of observations (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are presented in Table 1. 
We found support for Hypothesis 1’s prediction that the more that individuals feel powerful, 
the fewer gaps they perceive among their network advice contacts (b = -.34, 95% CI [-.64, -
.05], p = .02). As Table 2 shows, this effect remained significant after controlling for actual 
brokerage opportunities and the significant effect of formal organizational rank (b = .41, 95% 
CI [.15, .67], p = .002). 
----- Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here ----- 
 These results support the idea that the psychological experience of power blinds 
people to brokerage opportunities, even if these people have higher ranks that give them 
access to such opportunities. We conducted a second study, an experiment, to examine 
whether sense of power would causally affect brokerage perceptions among a group in which 
ego is not yet embedded, and to rule out potential alternative explanations. Specifically, we 
used a learning experiment to test both aspects of the paradox of agency that sense of power 
predicts fewer perceived brokerage opportunities, yet a greater willingness to broker. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 330 full-time U.S. employees (168 women, 162 men; Mage 
= 36.39, SD = 9.86) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate in a study about 
social interactions and memory. Consistent with best practice recommendations for using 
MTurk samples (Cheung, Burns, Sinclair, & Sliter, 2017), we conducted several attention 
checks to minimize potential noise in the experiment (see Appendix A). 
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Procedure and measures. The study featured a power manipulation, followed by a 
network learning task and an assessment of willingness to broker. 
Power manipulation. We randomly assigned individuals to a high-power or low-
power condition. Drawing on classic (Kipnis, 1972; Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976) 
and more recent (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002) research, we manipulated participants’ 
experience of power using a role-based scenario. In the high-power (low-power) condition, 
participants read: 
You have recently been hired as an upper-level executive (entry-level employee) at a 
small-to-moderate sized company. As an upper-level executive (entry-level 
employee), you will have substantial (very little) power in the company, especially 
when it comes to control over resources, compensation, and who is responsible for 
different duties. Please take a moment to consider how it would feel to be in this role, 
and write 2-4 sentences about how it would feel. 
Reviews suggest that role-based manipulations reliably induce a sense of power in 
participants (Galinsky et al., 2008; Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015). We used the measure 
of personal sense of power from Study 1 as a manipulation check to examine whether 
participants in the high- and low-power conditions differed with respect to their 
psychological experience of power. 
Network learning task. To experimentally test for heuristic processing of social 
network relations, we followed prior research (e.g., De Soto, 1960; Janicik & Larrick, 2005) 
and conducted a network learning study as follows. Each participant was informed that their 
predecessor had provided them (as a newcomer) with potentially useful information about the 
relationship patterns between existing employees, such as who provides help and advice to 
whom. These relationship data, they were told, would be shown on the following page, where 
they would be asked to remember who, in their new team, provides help and advice to whom. 
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The network they were asked to learn is depicted in Figure 2 (not shown to participants). We 
stressed that participants, without writing anything down, should do their best to learn who 
provides help and advice to whom. Following these instructions, participants had 90 seconds 
to learn the advice network, after which the survey auto-advanced to the next page. 
----- Insert Figure 2 about here ----- 
 
Manipulation check. We asked participants, “In your new role, please consider how 
you would feel toward your new team when answering the following questions.” Participants 
completed the same eight-item Sense of Power measure as in Study 1 (Anderson, John, & 
Keltner, 2012; α = .97). 
Perceptions of brokerage opportunities. After completing the first attention check 
and the manipulation check, we presented participants with all 12 possible pairs of advice 
relations (e.g., Anthony offers help and advice to Brent, Anthony offers help and advice to 
Chris, etc.) and asked them to indicate whether each statement was true or false. We again 
emphasized that the purpose of the study was to test memory, so they should do the best they 
could from memory alone. There were four opportunities to “fill in” a brokerage opportunity 
by misperceiving directional, nonexistent ties from Anthony to David, from David to 
Anthony, from Chris to David, and from David to Chris (see Figure 2). We measured 
perceptions of brokerage opportunities as a number between zero and four, representing the 
number of ties each participant misperceived as existing between Anthony, Chris, and David. 
Brokerage action tendencies. We captured brokerage intentions with two questions 
concerning the coordination and control of information between each pair of people (the 
potential brokees) following Burt’s (1992) emphasis on two aspects of brokerage: (a) 
brokerage as coordination; and (b) brokerage as control of the flow of information or 
resources. We asked: 
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People sometimes come across information or ideas while speaking to one person that 
could be valuable or useful to another person. Considering what you know about who 
shares advice with whom in this team, how often would you share or relay 
information between each of the following two team members? 
For the question concerning control of information, we asked them to indicate how often they 
would seek to actively control the flow of information between each of the following two team 
members. Participants responded to the questions about control and coordination on a five-
point Likert scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Participants’ average responses (across all six 
possible dyads) to the control and coordination questions were positively correlated (r = .36, 
p < .001), indicating that brokerage intention scores were related but conceptually and 
empirically distinguishable. 
Results and Discussion 
 Manipulation check. Respondents in the high-power role reported a higher sense of 
power (M = 5.74, SD = .83) than those in the low-power role (M = 2.64, SD = 1.06), t(328) = 
29.72, p < .001. 
Hypothesis tests. In support of Hypothesis 1, we found that respondents in the high-
power condition saw more ties between actually disconnected people and therefore fewer 
brokerage opportunities (M = 1.61, SD = 1.33) than respondents in the low-power condition 
(M = 1.31, SD = 1.17), t(321) = 2.13, p = .03, d = .24. But those in the high-power group 
were not significantly different from those in the low-power group in recalling ties between 
actors in the network who were actually connected, p = .31. Moreover, high-power group 
respondents were not significantly more accurate at recalling ties across the entire network 
(M = 8.92, SD = 2.27) than those in the low-power group (M = 9.01, SD = 2.27), p = .72. 
Thus, the results reflect a tendency for the powerful to fill in the blanks among disconnected 
people, rather than to be generally inaccurate in their recollections. 
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In support of Hypothesis 2, respondents in the high-power condition (relative to those 
in the low-power condition) expressed greater willingness to share or relay information 
between team members, whether there was an actual disconnect to be brokered (MHP = 3.08, 
SDHP = 1.14 vs. MLP = 2.77, SDLP = 1.05), t(324) = 3.28, p = .001, d = .28, or not (MHP = 
3.66, SDHP = .92 vs. MLP = 3.33, SDLP = .89), t(326) = 2.58, p = .01, d = .36. The same 
pattern of results characterized respondents’ willingness to control information between team 
members. Respondents in the high-power condition were more willing to control information 
flow across both disconnected people (M = 2.80, SD = 1.11) than individuals in the low-
power condition (M = 2.23, SD = 1.07), t(326) = 4.74, p < .001); and more willing to control 
information flow across people who were already connected and who, therefore, did not need 
third-party brokerage (MHP = 2.93, SDHP = 1.16 vs. MLP = 2.47, SDLP = 1.08), t(324) = 3.73, p 
< .001, d = .41. Thus, respondents in the high-power condition exhibited greater willingness 
to broker across relationships, whether the potential brokees were disconnected from each 
other or not. 
This experiment extends earlier findings in several directions. First, we replicated and 
extended the finding from Study 1 that feelings of power lead people to see fewer brokerage 
opportunities. This effect occurs in both naturally occurring networks (Study 1) but also in 
the internally valid setting of a controlled experiment. Second, the experiment helps provide 
causal evidence for this relationship. Finally, we showed that, although sense of power relates 
to perceiving fewer brokerage opportunities, feeling powerful, relative to experiencing little 
power, relates to being willing to broker, irrespective of whether there is a brokerage 
opportunity. Of course, although MTurk offers an accessible and demographically diverse 
panel of U.S. working adults (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012),  
one possible limitation of our research is that this sample may lack representation from 
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different cultures or high-end executive ranks, thus restricting our ability to generalize to 
these contexts. 
General Discussion 
An enduring puzzle in the brokerage literature has been the wide variation in 
performance outcomes for individuals who occupy brokerage positions in social networks 
(e.g., Burt et al., 2013, p. 535). Occupants of brokerage positions are thought to enjoy a 
vision advantage – to not only perceive the disconnects among people in social networks, but 
also to recognize the potential for productively bridging across these contacts to enhance 
individual and organizational functioning (Burt, 2005). However, here we have highlighted 
two additional factors, beyond occupation of brokerage positions, which play an important 
role: accurate perception of brokerage opportunities, and willingness to act upon those 
opportunities. The two studies together show that people who feel powerful tend to exhibit a 
paradox of agency: They perceive fewer brokerage opportunities, yet (as in Study 2) they 
report themselves as more willing to take on brokerage activities. Our results thus suggest a 
partial answer to why mere occupancy of a brokerage position may be insufficient to generate 
this vision advantage: Those who feel powerful are likely to be blind to the gaps between 
people that represent brokerage opportunities.  
In approaching the question of brokerage from a psychological perspective, we 
challenge two of the major sociological assumptions current in the network literature. First, 
we challenge the sociological assumption (e.g., Cook et al., 1983) that actual network 
positions provide opportunities even when the occupants of positions are ignorant of network 
structure and their own positioning. We introduce to network research the importance of the 
psychological sense of power, which is distinct from power reflected in the network position 
alone or formal rank, but which affects the extent to which the individual perceives the 
possibilities of brokerage action. As prior work has suggested, before the advantages of a 
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network position can be taken up, the individual has to mentally simulate the resources he or 
she perceives as available (Smith et al., 2012). 
We also challenge the assumption that opportunity alone is sufficient to motivate 
pursuit of opportunity (Burt, 1992). In addressing repeated calls from scholars to provide 
greater insight into the social psychological foundations of brokerage (Burt et al., 2013; 
Kilduff & Tsai, 2003; Stovel & Shaw, 2012), we uncovered a tendency for people who felt 
powerful to express a willingness to broker, even when no brokerage opportunity existed, 
either in terms of the actual network, or the network people perceived (see Study 2). By 
contrast, people who felt they were lacking in power were less willing to broker. 
In terms of future research, it may be that many individuals interpret missing 
connections not as opportunities (as noted by one of our reviewers) but as signs of discord to 
be avoided. We need to better understand the link between what the network structure affords 
and how the individual perceives the constraints and opportunities inherent in the network 
structure. Future work could explore how the psychological experience of power affects 
additional types of brokerage that individuals engage in, such as bringing people together 
(Obstfeld, 2005) or keeping people apart (Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010). 
More generally, realizing the benefits of brokerage may depend on the joint 
combination of three factors: structural position, accurate perception of the structure, and 
willingness to act upon the opportunities provided by the structure. Moreover, all three 
variables may fluctuate over time, helping explain why some individuals benefit from 
brokerage at different points in their careers. Future research should examine the performance 
consequences of the interactions between these variables. 
Our theory and findings open avenues for future research on the psychology of social 
networks as called for in a recent special issue (Casciaro et al., 2015). Whereas past research 
has emphasized the powerful nature of the brokerage role (e.g., Cook et al., 1983), we have 
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uncovered differences between structural power, as defined by one’s structural opportunities, 
and feeling powerful. Our results suggest that those who feel less powerful are better at 
detecting brokerage opportunities in organizational settings. Future research can explore how 
those who feel powerful manage the paradox of being more willing to broker, yet less able to 
perceive brokerage. One possibility is that brokerage is most effective when those who feel 
less powerful assist more powerful colleagues in charting the brokerage opportunities 
available. Thus, brokerage might be most effective when it involves collective rather than 
individual action. Future research can also investigate the mediating mechanisms (such as a 
reliance on abstract construals) through which sense of power affects the tendency to 
perceive absent connections (missing links) in network relations. 
 The findings point to practical implications for those at both ends of the power 
continuum. Engaging in brokerage requires institutional standing (Burt, 2005), so newcomers 
to organizations may find themselves unable to exploit brokerage opportunities even if they 
recognize their availability (Burt, 1992). The path to brokerage influence for those who feel 
relatively powerless may require forging relationships with influential mentors (Sparrowe & 
Liden, 2005), and those who feel powerful can help those who feel less powerful engage in 
the kinds of instrumental networking that is often seen as aversive by those who feel 
disempowered (Casciaro, Gino, & Kouchaki, 2014). 
 In conclusion, those who experience power are ready and willing to engage in 
brokerage behavior, but may be unable to recognize where their efforts are likely to be 
required. The less powerful, by contrast, are likely to perceive brokerage opportunities 
accurately and, therefore, have opportunities to reap the rewards of brokerage. If our research 
has one overriding message, it is that power and brokerage, commonly thought to coexist, 
may be in a state of tension, such that the more power the individual feels, the less brokerage 
the individual perceives. 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      19 
 
References 
Anderson, C., & Berdahl, J. L. (2002). The experience of power: Examining the effects of 
power on approach and inhibition tendencies. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 83(6), 1362–1377. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.83.6.1362 
Anderson, C., John, O. P., & Keltner, D. (2012). The personal sense of power. Journal of 
Personality, 80(2), 313–344. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00734.x 
Anderson, C., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. (2003). Emotional convergence between people 
over time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(5), 1054–1068. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.84.5.1054 
Anderson, C., & Kilduff, G. J. (2009). Why do dominant personalities attain influence in 
face-to-face groups? The competence-signaling effects of trait dominance. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 96(2), 491–503. doi:10.1037/a0014201 
Baer, M., Evans, K., Oldham, G. R., & Boasso, A. (2015). The social network side of 
individual innovation: A meta-analysis and path-analytic integration. Organizational 
Psychology Review, 5(3), 191–223. doi:10.1177/2041386614564105 
Bakan, D. (1966). The duality of human existence: An essay on psychology and religion. 
Oxford, England: Rand McNally. 
Brands, R. A. (2013). Cognitive social structures in social network research: A review. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 34(S1), 82–103. 
Brashears, M. E., & Quintane, E. (2015). The microstructures of network recall: How social 
networks are encoded and represented in human memory. Social Networks, 41, 113–
126. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2014.11.003 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A new 
source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
6(1), 3–5. doi:10.1177/1745691610393980 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      20 
 
Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Burt, R. S. (2004). Structural holes and good ideas. American Journal of Sociology, 110(2), 
349–399. doi:10.1086/421787 
Burt, R. S. (2005). Brokerage and closure: An introduction to social capital. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Burt, R. S., Kilduff, M., & Tasselli, S. (2013). Social network analysis: Foundations and 
frontiers on advantage. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 527–547. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143828 
Cartwright, D., & Harary, F. (1956). Structural balance: A generalization of Heider’s theory. 
Psychological Review, 63(5), 277–293. 
Casciaro, T., Barsade, S. G., Edmondson, A. C., Gibson, C. B., Krackhardt, D., & Labianca, 
G. (2015). The integration of psychological and network perspectives in organizational 
scholarship. Organization Science, 26(4), 1162–1176. doi:10.1287/orsc.2015.0988 
Casciaro, T., Gino, F., & Kouchaki, M. (2014). The contaminating effects of building 
instrumental ties: How networking can make us feel dirty. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 59(4), 705–735. doi:10.1177/0001839214554990 
Cheung, J. H., Burns, D. K., Sinclair, R. R., & Sliter, M. (2017). Amazon Mechanical Turk in 
organizational psychology: An evaluation and practical recommendations. Journal of 
Business and Psychology, 32(4), 347–361. doi:10.1007/s10869-016-9458-5 
Cook, K. S., Emerson, R. M., Gillmore, M. R., & Yamagishi, T. (1983). The distribution of 
power in exchange networks: Theory and experimental results. American Journal of 
Sociology, 89(2), 275–305. 
Cook, K. S., & Whitmeyer, J. M. (1992). Two approaches to social structure: Exchange 
theory and network analysis. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 109–127. 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      21 
 
De Soto, C. B. (1960). Learning a social structure. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 60(3), 417–421. Available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19674093 
Fang, R., Landis, B., Zhang, Z., Anderson, M. H., Shaw, J. D., & Kilduff, M. (2015). 
Integrating personality and social networks: A meta-analysis of personality, network 
position, and work outcomes in organizations. Organization Science, 26(4), 1243–1260. 
doi:10.1287/orsc.2015.0972 
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. American 
Psychologist, 48(6), 621–628. Available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8328729 
Foa, U. G., & Foa, E. B. (1974). Societal structures of the mind. Oxford, England: Charles C. 
Thomas. 
Freeman, L. C. (1977). A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry, 
40(1), 35–41. 
Freeman, L. C. (1992). Filling in the blanks: A theory of cognitive categories and the 
structure of social affiliation. Social Psychology Quarterly, 55(2), 118. 
doi:10.2307/2786941 
Freeman, L. C., Romney, A. K., & Freeman, S. C. (1987). Cognitive structure and informant 
accuracy. American Anthropologist, 89(2), 310–325. 
Galinsky, A. D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Magee, J. C. (2003). From power to action. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 453–466. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.3.453 
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H., Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. (2008). 
Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and 
dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1450–1466. 
doi:10.1037/a0012633 
Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Inesi, M. E., & Gruenfeld, D. H. (2006). Power and 
perspectives not taken. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1068–1074. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      22 
 
9280.2006.01824.x 
Galinsky, A. D., Rucker, D. D., Magee, J. C. (2015). Power: Past findings, present 
considerations, and future directions. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaer (Eds.), APA 
Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology, (pp. 421-460). Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
Granovetter, M. (2005). The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 33-50. 
Guinote, A. (2017). How power affects people: Activating, wanting, and goal seeking. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 68, 353–381. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044153 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Hogan, R. T. (1983). A socioanalytic theory of personality. In Nebraska symposium on 
motivation, 1982: Personality-Current theory and research (pp. 55–89). Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Holland, P. W., & Leinhardt, S. (1970). A method for detecting structure in sociometric data. 
American Journal of Sociology, 76(3), 492–513. 
Janicik, G. A., & Larrick, R. P. (2005). Social network schemas and the learning of 
incomplete networks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88(2), 348–364. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.2.348 
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. 
Psychological Review, 110(2), 265–284. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265 
Kilduff, M., & Brass, D. J. (2010). Organizational social network research: Core ideas and 
key debates. Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 317–357. 
doi:10.1080/19416520.2010.494827 
Kilduff, M., & Krackhardt, D. (1994). Bringing the individual back in: A structural analysis 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      23 
 
of the internal market for reputation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 
37(1), 87–108. doi:10.2307/256771 
Kilduff, M., & Tsai, W. (2003). Social networks and organizations. London, UK: Sage 
Publications. 
Kipnis, D. (1972). Does power corrupt? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24(1), 
33–41. 
Kipnis, D., Castell, J., Gergen, M., & Mauch, D. (1976). Metamorphic effects of power. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 61(2), 127–135. 
Kleinbaum, A. M. (2012). Organizational misfits and the origins of brokerage in intrafirm 
networks. Administrative Science Quarterly, 57(3), 407–452. 
doi:10.1177/0001839212461141 
Krackhardt, D. (1987). Cognitive social structures. Social Networks, 9(2), 109–134. 
Krackhardt, D., & Kilduff, M. (1999). Whether close or far: Social distance effects on 
perceived balance in friendship networks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
76(5), 770–782. 
Lammers, J., Galinsky, A. D., Gordijn, E. H., & Otten, S. (2008). Illegitimacy moderates the 
effects of power on approach. Psychological Science, 19(6), 558–564. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02123.x 
Lingo, E. L., & O’Mahony, S. (2010). Nexus work: Brokerage on creative projects. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1), 47–81. doi:10.2189/asqu.2010.55.1.47 
Madhavan, R., Gnyawali, D. R., & He, J. (2004). Two’s company, three’s a crowd? Triads in 
cooperative-competitive networks. Academy of Management Journal, 47(6), 918–927. 
doi:10.1038/nphys3448 
Magee, J. C., & Smith, P. K. (2013). The social distance theory of power. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 17(2), 158–186. doi:10.1177/1088868312472732 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      24 
 
Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of 
power and status. Academy of Management Annals, 2(1), 351–398. 
doi:10.1080/19416520802211628 
Mason, W., & Suri, S. (2012). Conducting behavioral research on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. Behavior Research Methods, 44(1), 1–23. doi:10.3758/s13428-011-0124-6 
Mehra, A., Kilduff, M., & Brass, D. J. (2001). The social networks of high and low self-
monitors: Implications for workplace performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
46(1), 121–146. 
Mehra, A., & Schenkel, M. T. (2008). The price chameleons pay: Self-monitoring, boundary 
spanning and role conflict in the workplace. British Journal of Management, 19(2), 138–
144. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8551.2007.00535.x 
Moskowitz, D. S. (1994). Cross-situational generality and the interpersonal circumplex. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 921–933. 
Neuhofer, S., Kittel, B., & Reindl, I. (2016). Social exchange networks: A review of 
experimental studies. Connections, 35(2), 34. 
Obstfeld, D. (2005). Social networks, the tertius iungens orientation, and involvement in 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(1), 100–130. 
doi:10.2189/asqu.2005.50.1.100 
Oh, H., & Kilduff, M. (2008). The ripple effect of personality on social structure: self-
monitoring origins of network brokerage. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(5), 1155–
1164. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.93.5.1155 
Papke, L. E., & Wooldridge, J. M. (1996). Econometric methods for fractional response 
variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 11(6), 619–632. doi:10.2307/2285155 
Podolny, J. M., & Baron, J. N. (1997). Resources and relationships: Social networks and 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      25 
 
mobility in the workplace. American Sociological Review, 62(5), 673–693. 
Sasovova, Z., Mehra, A., Borgatti, S. P., & Schippers, M. C. (2010). Network churn: The 
effects of self-monitoring personality on brokerage dynamics. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 55(4), 639–670. 
Simmel, G. (1923). The sociology of Georg Simmel (KH Wolff, trans.). New York: The Free 
Press. 
Simpson, B., & Borch, C. (2005). Does power affect perception in social networks? Two 
arguments and an experimental test. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68(3), 278–287. 
Simpson, B., Markovsky, B., & Steketee, M. (2011). Power and the perception of social 
networks. Social Networks, 33(2), 166–171. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2010.10.007 
Smith, E. B., Menon, T., & Thompson, L. (2012). Status differences in the cognitive 
activation of social networks. Organization Science, 23(1), 67–82. 
doi:10.1287/orsc.1100.0643 
Smith, P. K., & Trope, Y. (2006). You focus on the forest when you’re in charge of the trees: 
Power priming and abstract information processing. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 90(4), 578–596. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.4.578 
Sparrowe, R. T., & Liden, R. C. (2005). Two routes to influence: Integrating leader-member 
exchange and social network perspectives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(4), 
505–535. 
Stovel, K., & Shaw, L. (2012). Brokerage. Annual Review of Sociology, 38, 139–158. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-150054 
Totterdell, P., Holman, D., & Hukin, A. (2008). Social networkers: Measuring and examining 
individual differences in propensity to connect with others. Social Networks, 30(4), 283–
296. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2008.04.003 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. 
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      26 
 
Psychological Review, 117(2), 440–463. doi:10.1037/a0018963 
Van Kleef, G. A., Oveis, C., Van Der Löwe, I., LuoKogan, A., Goetz, J., & Keltner, D. 
(2008). Power, distress, and compassion: Turning a blind eye to the suffering of others. 
Psychological Science, 19(12), 1315–1322. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02241.x 
Wiggins, J. S. (1979). A psychological taxonomy of trait-descriptive terms: The interpersonal 
domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(3), 395–412. 
Woltin, K. A., Corneille, O., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Förster, J. (2011). Narrowing down to open 
up for other people’s concerns: Empathic concern can be enhanced by inducing detailed 
processing. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 418–424. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.11.006 
Xiao, Z., & Tsui, A. S. (2007). When brokers may not work: The cultural contingency of 
social capital in Chinese high-tech firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1), 1–31. 
Yamagishi, T., Gillmore, M. R., & Cook, K. S. (1988). Network connections and the 
distribution of power in exchange networks. American Journal of Sociology, 93(4), 833–
851. 
  
     SENSE OF POWER AND BROKERAGE      27 
 
Footnotes 
1
 An ego network with only one alter received a score of zero because of insufficient 
alters for a brokerage opportunity to exist. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study 1 
   
Variable Mean      SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
1. Age 34.44 8.29          
2. Gender .40 .49 -.24**         
3. Rank 3.44 1.27 -.62*** -.06*        
4. Propensity to broker 5.81 .79 -.04** -.13* -.03**       
5. Actual network size .29 .14 -.25** -.15* -.42*** -.17*      
6. Perceived network size .35 .21 -.14** -.03* -.10* -.22** -.24**     
7. Actual network brokerage 
opportunities 
.56 .25 -.06** -.01* -.01** -.03 -.05 -.08    
8. Perceived network brokerage 
opportunities 
.58 .38 -.07** -.04* -.15* -.04 -.11 -.23** -.05   
9. Sense of power 4.81 .90 -.03** -.07* -.12** .22*** -.00 -.08 -.11 -.10  
Note. N = 162. Gender is coded 1 for female, 0 for male. * p < .05 (two-tailed) ** p < .01 (two-tailed) *** p < .001 (two-tailed) 
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Table 2   
Results of a Fractional Logit Regression Model Predicting Perceived Brokerage 
Opportunities in Study 1 
 
Perceived Brokerage Opportunities 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Intercept 6.82** 5.79 7.91** 5.82 
Sales department -.29** .36 -.32** .36 
Customer service department -.10** .47 -.06** .47 
Creative design department -.13** .33 -.08** .33 
Age -.00** .02 -.01** .02 
Gender -.26** .27 -.38** .27 
Rank -.34** .13 -.41** .13 
Propensity to broker -.08** .06 -.12** .07 
Actual network size -.09** .04 -.10** .04 
Perceived network size -.19** .06 -.18** .06 
Actual brokerage 
opportunities -.58** .49 -.77** .49 
Sense of power   -.34** .15 
     Pseudo R
2
 .06**   .07** 
 
     Log pseudolikelihood -103.77* -102.28  
     df **152     * 151  
Note. N = 162. We report unstandardized coefficients and robust standard errors. Actual 
network size reflects incoming ties (where the network is defined from the alters’ 
perspective), whereas perceived network size reflects outgoing ties only (where the network 
is defined from ego’s perspective). * p < .05 ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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Fig. 1 
Perceived Brokerage Opportunities in the Organizational Advice Network in Study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The left-hand diagram represents a transitivity score of 1, whereas the right-hand 
diagram represents a transitivity score of 0. Higher transitivity indicates fewer brokerage 
opportunities. 
  
A 
C B 
A 
C B 
No brokerage 
opportunity 
Brokerage 
opportunity 
between B and C 
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Fig. 2 
Social Network for Study 2 
 
Note. The network of relations participants learned in Study 2 (diagram not shown to 
participants). A = Anthony, B = Brent, C = Chris, D = David. 
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Appendix 
 
Supplemental Analyses for Study 1 
 To increase comparability with prior brokerage research, we examined whether 
results changed in Study 1 when we included alternative measures of brokerage. We first 
tested whether the results would hold if we controlled for network constraint, which is often 
used to measure brokerage in structural network research (e.g., Burt, 1992). Network 
constraint is a composite statistic comprised of ego network density, size, and hierarchy (the 
extent to which an alter rivals ego in terms of similar contacts with ego’s contacts). When we 
add network constraint as a control for structural position to the model reported in Table 2 
(all other reported variables also included in the model), sense of power remains a significant 
predictor of perceived brokerage opportunities (b = -.38, 95% CI [-.67, -.09], p = .01). 
The results are similar if we control for another variable that is often used to proxy 
brokerage – betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977). The betweenness centrality of an actor 
is the extent to which the actor occupies a position on the shortest paths between all other 
actors in the network. When betweenness centrality is included instead of network constraint, 
sense of power remains a significant predictor of perceived brokerage opportunities (b = -.34, 
95% CI [-.63, -.05], p = .02). 
We also considered the issue of treating network constraint as an outcome measure. 
However, although some prior network research uses network constraint (Burt, 1992) to 
measure brokerage opportunities surrounding ego, network constraint is a composite statistic 
comprised of ego’s network density, size, and the extent to which ego’s network is 
characterized by hierarchy (i.e., the extent to which an alter rivals ego in terms of similar 
contacts with ego’s contacts). We have no theory concerning how power may affect ego’s 
perception of size, hierarchy, or density, so we therefore focused on transitivity, which 
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represents closure around the dyad, given that our theorizing focuses on gaps (missing 
connections) among ego’s direct contacts. 
Screening Criteria for Study 2 
Here we provide further details about how we screened participants in the sample 
used in Study 2. We first included an attention check: After participants studied the network, 
we asked them to enter the name of their role in the company to ensure that participants had 
been paying attention. We excluded 41 participants for failing to report the correct role (final 
sample as above). At the end of the survey, we asked participants if they were distracted at 
any point while completing it, given that distractions could interfere with their ability to learn 
and recall the network relations. We also asked participants if they had written anything 
down. We stressed that their payment for the research would not be affected by anything that 
they wrote, and that providing clear and honest responses to these questions would aid data 
analysis. We removed six cases because individuals indicated that they had been distracted 
(final sample as reported). Finally, we read responses to the power manipulation to ensure 
that participants followed instructions; no participants were removed for failing to follow 
instructions. 
